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DOWD, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
U.S. Citizens Association, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Kathleen Sebelius, et al,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 5:10 CV 1065
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
I.  Introduction
The plaintiffs, by their second amended complaint (Doc. 45), seek declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to the individual mandate to purchase health insurance beginning in
the year 2014 as required by the recently adopted federal health care reform law as set forth in
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, (hereinafter PPACA) Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (the “Act”).  The plaintiffs allege the Act is unconstitutional with
respect to the mandate to purchase health insurance by the year 2014 or suffer a penalty. 
Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the Act violates the Commerce Clause in Article I of the United
States Constitution (Count 1), plaintiffs’ freedom of expressive and intimate association
guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Count 2), the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Count 3), and
plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right to privacy (Count 4).
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Plaintiffs request the following relief:
(1) Declare that the PPACA unconstitutionally exceeds
Congress’s authority under Article I, Section 8, because the
Congress has no power to legislate that individuals purchase a
particular product, here heath insurance, with after-tax dollars:
(2) Declare that the PPACA violates Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 because it regulates those who do not have health
insurance and do not wish to have health insurance despite the
absence of activity on their part affecting interstate commerce in
health insurance or health care; 
(3) Declare that the PPACA is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment because it unlawfully infringes on the Plaintiff’s
members’ freedom not to associate with private health insurers
“qualified” under the PPACA;
(4) Declare that the PPACA is unconstitutional under the First
and Fifth Amendments because it infringes the Plaintiffs’ right to
intimate association with doctors of their choosing and compels an
intimate association with insurers that provide coverage for
medical methods and approaches Plaintiffs do not desire.
(5) Declare that the PPACA is unconstitutional under the Fifth
Amendment because it deprives the Plaintiffs of their fundamental
liberty right to refuse payment for private health insurance for
unwanted medical services;
(6) Declare that the PPACA is unconstitutional because it
violates the Plaintiffs’ right to privacy protected by the Fifth
Amendment liberty provision, the Ninth Amendment rights
retained by the people, and the rights emanating from First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the United States
Constitution in that it compels disclosure of confidential medical
information to private insurers;
 
(7) Enjoin the Defendants from enforcing the PPACA against
USCA members;
(8) Award plaintiffs’ counsel fees and costs as is deemed
appropriate and just under the Equal Access to Justice Act;
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(9) Retain jurisdiction of this action to ensure compliance with
this Court’s decree; and
(10) Grant such other and further relief as the Court deems
equitable, just and proper.
The defendants have moved to dismiss all four counts of plaintiffs’ second amended
complaint.  Doc. 47.  Plaintiffs have opposed the motion (Doc. 50), and defendants have replied  
(Doc. 57).  An amicus curiae brief has been filed on behalf of the Alliance for Natural Health -
USA1 in support of the plaintiffs’ opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss.  Doc. 54.  
For the reasons contained herein, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part.   
II.  Similar Litigation in Other States Attacking the Mandate 
to Purchase Health Insurance by 2014
The Congressional enactment that citizens shall be required to buy health insurance or
suffer a penalty has resulted in litigation across and the United States, and specifically, in United
States District Courts in California, Florida, Virginia and Michigan.  The results in other United
States District Courts to date, in responding to motions to dismiss, have been mixed.  In Florida,
United States District Court Judge Roger Vinson denied a similar motion to dismiss, as did
District Court Judge Henry Hudson of Virginia.  To the contrary, United States District Court
Judge Dana M. Sabraw in the Southern District of California granted a similar motion to dismiss,
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and denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.  
In the Eastern District of Michigan, District Court Judge George Caram Steeh, with the
agreement of the parties, consolidated the trial and preliminary injunction hearing on plaintiffs’
Commerce Clause and tax power claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). 
Also in that case, the parties agreed that there were no factual disputes to be resolved and the
matter could be decided as a matter of law.  In an opinion issued after a hearing, Judge Steeh
determined that the plaintiffs had standing, the case was ripe for the court’s consideration, and
that the court was not barred from hearing the case by the Anti-Injunction Act.  Judge Steeh then
went on to analyze the merits of plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause and tax power claims, concluding
that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the PPACA and that the
penalty imposed by Congress for failing to comply with the minimum coverage provision is
incidental to that power.  As a consequence, Judge Steeh denied plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction and found for defendants on plaintiffs’ first and second claims for relief,
and dismissed those claims.  Thomas More Law Center, et al. v. Obama, et al., 2010 WL
3952805 (E.D. Mich.).  Judge Steeh subsequently entered a stipulated order dismissing plaintiffs
remaining claims without prejudice, and plaintiffs have appealed to the United States Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is apparent to the undersigned that the controversy ignited by the passage of the
legislation at issue in this case will eventually require a decision by the Supreme Court after the
above-described litigation works its way through the various circuit courts.  Against that
background, this Court does not intend to write a lengthy opinion with respect to the defendants’
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motion to dismiss because the Court’s decision will, in all likelihood, be without relevance by
the time this case reaches the Supreme Court.
III.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Standing and/or Ripeness
In granting the government’s motion to dismiss, Judge Sabraw in the Southern District of
California, determined that the plaintiffs’ claims failed on standing grounds failing to find injury
in fact.  Continuing, Judge Sabraw opined that “Allegations of future injury will satisfy the
requirement ‘only if [the plaintiff] is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
the result of the challenged official conduct’.”  After finding no injury in fact, Judge Sabraw
granted the government’s motion to dismiss.  
Judge Vinson’s opinion, filed on the 14th of October, 2010, reached different conclusions
as to both standing and ripeness.  Judge Vinson concluded that the 40-month delay before the
mandate becomes effective in the year 2014, did not eliminate the issue of standing because of a
certainty that the mandate will go into effect absent a judicial declaration or a change in the
legislation by the Congress, and the fact of the certainty provided a sufficient basis to support
standing.
As to the issue of ripeness, Judge Vinson declared: 
There is a “conspicuous overlap” between the doctrines of
standing and ripeness and the two “often converge[].”  See Elend
v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2006).  Nevertheless,
they warrant separate analyses.
“Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing.  Its basic rationale is
to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreement.”  Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agr. Products Co. 473 U.S. 568, 580, 105 S. Ct.
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3325, 87 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1985) (citations and alterations omitted). 
“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all.”  Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S. Ct.
1257, 140 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1998) (citation omitted).  The ripeness
inquiry turns on “‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’
and ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration.’”  Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201, 103
S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983) (citation omitted).  In the
context of a facial challenge, as in this case, “a purely legal claim
is presumptively ripe for judicial review because it does not
require a developed factual record.”  Harris v. Mexican Speciality
Foods, Inc., 564 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009).
Because the individual mandate and employer mandate will not
take effect until 2014, the defendants contend that those claims are
unripe because no injury can occur before that time.  However,
“[w]here the inevitability of the operation of a statute against
[plaintiffs] is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable
controversy that there will be a time delay before the disputed
provisions come into effect.”  Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins.
Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 143, 95 S. Ct. 335, 42 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1974). 
“The Supreme Court has long ... held that where the enforcement
of a statute is certain, a preenforcement challenge will not be
rejected on ripeness grounds.”  NAACP, supra, 522 F.3d at 1164
(citing Blanchette, supra, 419 U.S. at 143).
The complained of injury in this case is “certainly impending” as
there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that the federal government
will enforce the individual mandate and employer mandate against
the plaintiffs.  Indeed, with respect to the individual mandate in
particular, the defendants concede that it is absolutely necessary
for the Act’s insurance market reforms to work as intended.  In
fact, they refer to it as an “essential” part of the Act as least
fourteen times in their motion to dismiss.  It will clearly have to be
enforced.  See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 592-93, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S. Ct. 658 (1923)
(suit filed shortly after the challenged statute passed into law and
before it was enforced was not premature where the statute
“certainly would operate as the complainant states apprehended it
would”).  The individual mandate will have to be imposed and
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enforced against the plaintiffs and others because if it is not, and
with proscriptions against insurance companies denying coverage
for pre-existing medical conditions, there would the potential for
an enormous moral hazard.
The fact that the individual mandate and employer mandate do not
go into effect until 2014 does not mean that they will not be felt in
the immediate or very near future.  To be sure, responsible
individuals, businesses, and states will have to start making plans
now or very shortly to comply with the Act’s various mandates. 
Individuals who are presently insured will have to confirm that 
their current plans comply with the Act’s requirements and, if not,
take appropriate steps to comply; the uninsured will need to
research available insurance plans, find one that meets their needs,
and begin budgeting accordingly; and employers and states will
need to revamp their healthcare programs to ensure full
compliance.  I note that at least two courts considering challenges
to the individual mandate have thus far denied motions to dismiss
on standing and ripeness grounds.  See Virginia, supra, 702 F.
Supp. 2d at 607-08 (determining that because the individual
mandate “radically changes the landscape of health insurance
coverage in America,” it will be felt by individuals, insurance
carriers, employers, and states “in the near future”); Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, 2010 WL 3952805, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
7, 2010) (“[T]he government is requiring plaintiffs to undertake an
expenditure, for which the government must anticipate that
significant financial planning will be required.  That financial
planning must take place well in advance of the actual purchase of
insurance in 2014 ... There is nothing improbable about the
contention that the Individual Mandate is causing plaintiffs to feel
economic pressure today.”)
The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, as noted, have not
hesitated to consider pre-enforcement challenges to the
constitutionality of legislation when the complained of injury is
certainly impending and more than a hypothetical possibility. 
Because the issues in this case are fully framed, and the relevant
facts are settled, “[n]othing would be gained by postponing a
decision, and the public interest would be well served by a prompt
resolution of constitutionality of the [the statute].”  See Thomas,
supra, 473 U.S. at 582.  Therefore, the case is ripe for review.
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After reviewing the opinions of Judge Sabraw and Judge Vinson, the Court finds the
reasoning of Judge Vinson in keeping with this judge’s view.  Consequently, the motion of the
defendants to dismiss based on standing and ripeness is denied.  
IV.  The Motion of the Defendants to Dismiss Based Upon the 
Argument that the Penalty for Failure to Buy Health Insurance 
Should Be Dismissed as Prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act
Once again, the Court is indebted to the thoughtful analysis of Judge Vinson with respect
to whether the Anti-Injunction Act applies.  His analysis begins at page seven of a 65-page
opinion and continues through to the top of page thirty, and is attached hereto as 
Appendix I.
Once again, the Court agrees with the thoughtful and careful analysis of Judge Vinson
and, as a consequence, denies the motion to dismiss based upon the defendants’ reliance on the
Anti-Injunction Act.  
V.  The Motion to Dismiss Based Upon the Proposition that the Mandatory Requirement 
to Purchase Health Insurance Does Not Violate the Commerce Clause
  
Count One of the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint alleges in part as follows:
35. Congress may act to regulate only pursuant to its
enumerated powers.  U.S. v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1445-46 (6th Cir.
1996) (“the power of Congress is by no means absolute: it may
exercise only those powers enumerated in the Constitution”);
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  The
federal legislative power derives solely from the federal
Constitution.
36. In PPACA Section 1501, Congress expressly relied on its
authority under the Commerce Clause in Article I (Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3): “The individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section ... is commercial and economic in
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nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of
the effects described in paragraph (2).”
37. The United States Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause
3 states that the United States Congress shall have the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  In United States v. Lopez, the
Supreme Court held that Congress may regulate three categories of
commerce: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) “those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce .. i.e., those
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”  United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (interpreting federal
statute that criminalized the possession of firearms within a school
zone).  Only the third category is implicated by Congress’s
mandatory insurance provision.  United States citizens who do not
possess and do not desire to possess health insurance, such as the
Individual Plaintiffs and other members of Plaintiff USCA, do not
engage in activities that substantially affect interstate commerce
simply by residing in-state.
The defendants’ motion to dismiss contends that the individual mandate requiring the
purchase of health insurance as set forth in Section 1501 under the title of “Requirement to
Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage” is a proper congressional exercise under the Commerce
Clause.   Secondly, the defendants contend that the passage of Section 1501 of the Act is a valid
exercise of Congress’s independent power under the general welfare clause.  Defendants argue
that Count 1of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can granted
based on the recent teachings of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).  
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At this stage of the proceedings, when considering the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the
issues before the Court regarding the commerce and the necessary and proper clauses constitute
the primary issues before the Court with respect to the validity of the challenged Act.  The Court
finds that the allegations advanced by plaintiffs in Count One of the second amended complaint
at this point pass the “plausibility” teachings of Twombly and Iqbal, supra.  
It is the Court’s view in this case that plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claim is not subject to
a final resolution based on a motion to dismiss, but requires additional consideration by the
Court in further proceedings.  As a consequence, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 1 of
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint is DENIED 
VI.  The Motion to Dismiss as it Relates to Counts Two, 
Three, Four of the Second Amended Complaint
Count Two of the second amended complaint alleges that the PPACA violates the
plaintiffs’ freedom of expressive and intimate association guaranteed by the First and Fifth
Amendments.  Count Three of the second amended complaint alleges that the PPACA violates
the Fifth Amendment due process clause.  Count Four alleges that the PPACA violates their
constitutional right to privacy.
In support of their motion to dismiss Count 2 (Doc. 47-1), defendants argue that:
[a]bsent any plausible allegation that the statute has impaired plaintiffs’ ability 
to express a message, this “mere association” does not violate the First 
Amendment. . . . because the [PP]ACA does not prohibit plaintiffs from joining 
together to advance their views on any subject, including the challenged 
provision . . . .
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After considering plaintiffs’ second amended complaint in the context of Twombly and
Iqbal’s heightened “plausibility” pleading standard, the Court concludes that Count 2 of
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint fails to satisfy that standard, and therefore cannot survive
defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Count 2.  The Court’s review of Counts 3 and 4 under the
Twombly and Iqbal analysis results in the same conclusion. 
Accordingly, defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts Two, Three and Four as set
forth in the second amended complaint is GRANTED.2
 VII.  Conclusion
For the reasons contained herein, defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in part and
granted in part.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count One of the second amended complaint is
DENIED.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts Two, Three and Four of the second amended
complaint is GRANTED.  
If either the plaintiffs or the defendants are of the view that a period of discovery is
necessary prior to the filing of dispositive motions, counsel should so indicate by  
December 3, 2010, and indicate how much time for discovery is needed.  
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If neither set of parties believe discovery is necessary, and upon such an indication by
December 3, 2010, the Court will publish a schedule for dispositive motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
   November 22, 2010
Date
    /s/ David D. Dowd, Jr.
David D. Dowd, Jr.
United States District Judge
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